SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING

APRIL 1, 1996

___ S.W.2d ___

Constitutional law -- provision under which appellant complained never shown to have been adopted -- mere legislative reccomendation does not constitute a classification which violates equal protection clause. -- Appellant's argument that, under Ark. Code Ann. §14-52-303(7)(also known as the Law Enforcement Officer's Bill of Rights), a police officer benefits from greater protection during an interrogation process than an accused and that there was no rational basis for such a distinction, failed, where it was clear that this "Bill of Rights" was in fact only a recommendation of the legislature giving municipalities the authority to establish procedures as a guide for negotiating personnel issues with their law enforcement officers, and the appellant made no showing that there was, in fact, a municipality which had actually adopted the particular provision of which he complained; the court could not assume that police officers were currently enjoying the procedural protections contemplated by the Act; mere recommendations by the legislature, which left open the authority of municipalities to establish or not establish all or any part of the law, did not constitute a classification that violated the equal protection clause.

We write to address an issue which we did not discuss in our February 19, 1996, opinion. In that portion of the appellant's brief devoted to the failure of the officers to record his entire interrogation, the appellant mentions briefly, and without citation to any authority, the possibility of an equal protection violation. His argument is based upon the existence of what is known as the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights, Ark. Code Ann. § 14-52-301 to 307 (Supp. 1995). In particular, he points to Ark. Code Ann. § 14-52-303(7) which provides in pertinent part:

All interrogations of a law enforcement officer in connection with an investigation against him or her shall be recorded in full.

The appellant's argument is that, under this statute, a police officer benefits from greater protection during an interrogation process than an accused. He claims that there is no rational basis for such a distinction. Without reaching the issue of whether a rational basis exists, we hold that the appellant's argument must fail. The "Bill of Rights" is in fact only a recommendation of the legislature ("the purpose of this subchapter is to recommend a basic Bill of Rights for law enforcement officers. . . ."), giving municipalities the authority to establish "any or all" of the Act's procedures as "a guide for negotiating personnel issues with their law enforcement officers." Ark. Code Ann. § 14-52-301 (Supp. 1995). The appellant has made no showing that there is, in fact, a municipality which has actually adopted the particular provision of which he complains. In other words, we cannot assume that police officers are currently enjoying the procedural protections contemplated by the Act. Therefore, we cannot say under these circumstances that mererecommendations by the legislature, which leave open the authority of municipalities to establish or not establish all or any part of the law, constitute a classification which violates the equal protection clause.

The other matters raised in appellant's petition for rehearing concern our holding on the Ark. R. Crim. P. Rule 2.3 issue. That issue was fully developed, both in the briefs and during oral argument, and was carefully considered by the court. It will not be addressed again on rehearing.